Introduction
Digital images are popularly used in most multimedia appli− cations. Usually, they are compressed and the compressed codes are stored because the raw image files require a lot of storage cost. From the literature, the image compression techniques can be divided into two categories: lossy com− pression and lossless compression. The lossy compression techniques are often used to compress the general−purpose images. Some lossy image coding techniques, such as block truncation coding [1] [2] [3] [4] , vector quantization [5] , colour image quantization, sub−band coding, JPEG, and JPEG 2000, have been proposed. On the contrary, the lossless image coding techniques are employed to process the spe− cial−purpose images, such as the military images and the medical images. Some lossless image coding techniques, such as Huffman coding, arithmetic coding, and JPEG/LS, have been proposed.
In recent decades, the research issue towards the image integrity protection becomes more and more important because the digital images can be easily copied and modi− fied by using the image processing software such as Adobe PhotoShop and PhotoImpact. A traditional cryptography approach can only be used to protect the security of digital data. In other words, the cryptography approach is not suit− able for the image integrity protection. When one crypto− graph scheme, such as RSA, AES, MD5, or RSA, is em− ployed to process the digital image, any changes from the encrypted data can be detected. However the tampered areas of the image cannot be located by using the cryptograph scheme.
The image authentication approach for image integrity protection has thus been proposed [6] . Generally, the image authentication schemes can be classified into two catego− ries: signature−based schemes [7] [8] [9] [10] and fragile water− mark−based schemes [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] . In a signature−based scheme, the given image is processed by using the hash function and the hashed result is encrypted by using the public key cry− ptosystem to generate the digital signature. Then, the digital signature of the image to be protected is stored in a trust third party. When the image is to be authenticated, the digi− tal signature is extracted from the trust third party and it is then compared to the other signature that is generated from the image to detect the tampered areas.
In a fragile watermark−based scheme, the watermark data is embedded into the protected image. Typically, the watermark data is generated by using either the image fea− tures extracted from the given image or the random values induced by the selected random number seed. When the image is to be authenticated, the watermark data is extracted from the image to detect the tampered areas. The detection accuracy and the image quality of the embedded image are the two major considerations for the fragile watermark− −based image authentication approach.
In 2001, Lin and Chang proposed a semi−fragile water− marking scheme which can be resistant to lossy compres− sion for JPEG images [11] . Wong and Memon proposed the secret and public key image watermarking schemes for image authentication and ownership verification in 2001 [12] . Lee and Lin proposed the dual watermark for both image tamper detection and image recovery in 2008 [13] . Ahmed and Siyal proposed an image authentication scheme based on the hash function in 2010 [14] . Qi and Xin pro− posed a quantization−based semi−fragile watermarking sche− me for image content authentication in 2011 [15] . Chung and Hu proposed an adaptive image authentication scheme for VQ compressed images in 2011 [16] . Chan proposed the image authentication method by applying the Hamming code on the rearranged bits in 2011 [17] . In addition, a tam− per detection and self−recovery scheme for biometric ima− ges has been introduced in 2012 [18] .
In this paper, we design a novel image authentication scheme for the compressed images of BTC. The authentica− tion data of each image block is embedded into the com− pressed codes of BTC. Multiple copies of the authentication data can be adaptively embedded into the bit maps of the other image blocks. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We will review some block truncation coding sche− mes in Sect. 2. Section 3 will present the proposed scheme. The experimental results will be discussed in Sect. 4. Finally, the conclusions will be given in Sect. 5.
Review on block truncation coding
In 1979, Delp and Ritcell first introduced the concept of the block truncation coding scheme [1] . The block truncation coding scheme is also called the moment−preserving block truncation coding (MPBTC) scheme because it preserves the first and second moments of image blocks. From the lite− rature, several modified schemes based on BTC, such as the generalized moment preserving quantization and the abso− lute moment block truncation coding (AMBTC) [2] , to pre− serve the sample mean and the sample first absolute central moment, have been proposed. These modified methods are introduced to hold different block properties.
Basically, the BTC scheme has very simple image enco− ding/decoding procedures and requires little computational complexity. It can be applied to the compression of mono− chrome images, moving imagery, colour imagery, and gra− phics. The main drawback of the BTC scheme is that its bit rate is high. Some improved methods have been proposed to cut down the bit rate of the BTC scheme [3] [4] . In this sec− tion, the moment preserving block truncation coding sche− me will be first described. Next, the absolute moment block truncation coding (AMBTC) scheme will be introduced.
Moment preservation block truncation coding
Basically, MPBTC consists of the image encoding proce− dure and the image decoding procedure. In the image enco− ding procedure, each grayscale image to be compressed is divided into a set of non−overlapping image blocks of n´n pixels. Each n´n image block can be viewed as an image vector of k dimensions, where k = n´n. Each image block is sequentially processed in the order of left−to−right and top−to−down.
First, the mean value ( ) x and the standard deviation ( ) s of each image block x are calculated. All the pixels in the image block are classified into two groups according to x. If the intensity of one pixel is less than or equal to x, it is clas− sified as the first group. Otherwise, it is classified as the se− cond group. A corresponding bit with value 0 or 1 is stored in the bit map (BM) when this pixel is classified as the first group or the second group, respectively. These two quantization levels a and b for these two groups are then computed according to the following equa− tions
and
Here, q stands for the number of pixels whose values are greater than or equal to x.
In MPBTC, the quantization levels a and b are designed so that the first and the second sample moments of each image block are preserved. Each compressed image block forms a trio (a, b, BM). Each quantization level is stored in 8 bits. In other words, (8+8+k) bits are needed to store the compressed codes (a, b, BM) of each compressed block of MPBTC. The required bit rate of MPBTC equals (8+8+k)/k bpp.
An image encoding example of MPBTC is depicted in Fig. 1 . Figure 1(a) shows the original 4´4 image block. The mean value and the standard deviation are 123 and 26.743, respectively. The pixels are classified into two groups based on the block mean value and the resultant bit map is shown in Fig. 1(b) . Then, these two quantization levels 88 and 144 are calculated by using Eqs. (1) and (2), respectively. The compressed trio [88, 144, (1000110011101111) 2 ] is sent to the receiver.
In the image decoding procedure, each image block is recovered by using the received trio (a, b, BM). To rebuild each image block using the received trio (a, b, BM), the cor− responding pixel is reconstructed by the quantization level a, if a corresponding bit valued 0 is found in the bit map BM. Otherwise, it is recovered by quantization level b. When each image block is sequentially recovered by using the above−mentioned steps, the whole decoded image of MPBTC can be reconstructed.
Continue the example described above, and the com− pressed block is to be recovered by using the trio [88, 144, (1000110011101111) 2 ]. The decoded image block is shown in Fig. 2(a) . The mean squared error between the original image block and the rebuilt block equals 89.5.
Absolute moment block truncation coding
Lema and Mitchell proposed the absolute moment block truncation coding (AMBTC) scheme for grayscale and co− lour image compression in 1984. AMBTC is proved to be the minimal mean squared error BTC scheme when the block mean value is taken as the quantization threshold to divide all the pixels in each image block into two groups. AMBTC and MPBTC share the same image encoding/deco− ding procedures. They only differ on the calculation of these two quantization levels.
To compress each image block x by AMBTC, the block mean value x is calculated and it is utilized as the quantiza− tion threshold to classify all the pixels in one block into two groups. If the intensity of one pixel is less than or equal to x, it is classified as the first group. Otherwise, it is classified as the second group. A corresponding bit with value 0 or 1 is stored in BM when this pixel is classified as the first group or the second group, respectively.
In AMBTC, two quantization levels a and b for these two groups are computed according to the following two equations
where q denotes the number of pixels whose values are greater than or equal to x. Each compressed block generates a trio (a, b, BM), where a and b are the two quantization levels, and BM stands for the bit map. By sequentially compressing each image block in the same way, the whole image is then compressed.
The image decoding procedure of AMBTC is the same as that of MPBTC. To reconstruct each compressed image block using the received trio (a, b, BM), the corresponding pixel is reconstructed by the quantization level a, if a corre− sponding bit valued 0 is found in the bit map. Otherwise, it is recovered by the quantization level b. When each image block is sequentially recovered by using the above−men− tioned steps, the whole decoded image of MPBTC can be reconstructed.
An example of the image encoding of AMBTC is de− scribed here. Figure 1(a) shows the original image block of 4´4 pixels. The block mean value of the image block equals 123. The same bit map as that of MPBTC is shown in Fig. 1(b) . Then, the quantization levels for these two groups are then calculated by using Eqs. (3) and (4), respectively. These two quantization levels are 92 and 142, respectively. Finally, the compressed trio [92, 142, (1000110011101111) 2 ] is sent to the receiver.
Continue the example, and the decoded image block is shown in Fig. 2(b) . The mean squared error between the original image block and the rebuilt block equals 81.5. Compared to result of MPBTC, AMPBTC provides better reconstructed image quality subject to the criterion of the mean squared error measurement.
The proposed scheme
The goal of the proposed scheme is to detect the tampered areas for the compressed images of BTC. To protect the image integrity, the authentication data is embedded into the bit maps of the BTC−compressed blocks. The number of the authentication data for each image block can be adaptively selected.
The authentication code generation procedure
Suppose the BTC−compressed image of W´H pixels is to be processed and the block size is set to n´n. A total of w´h ima− ge blocks of n´n pixels have already compressed by BTC where w = W/n and h = H/n. In other words, the compressed codes of the BTC−compressed image consist of w´h trios of (a, b, BM). To generate the 1−bit authentication code for each image block x, the absolute difference between these two quantization levels a and b is calculated. The rule to generate the 1−bit authentication code (ac) for each image block x is listed in the following
Here, DTH is a predefined threshold to control the degree of similarity between the two quantization levels. If the two quantization levels of each compressed block are quite simi− lar, a corresponding authentication code with value 0 is stored. Otherwise, the authentication code with value 1 is stored. By sequentially extracting the compressed trio (a, b, BM) for each compressed block, the authentication code of 1 bit can be generated by using the above−mentioned process.
The authentication codes embedding procedure
The flowchart of authentication codes for embedding proce− dure is depicted in Fig. 3 . Let sno denote the number of authentication codes for each image block that will be em− bedded into the bit maps of other image blocks. To deter− mine the image blocks to embed these sno copies of authen− tication codes, sno random number seeds should be previ− ously selected. The random sequence induced by each ran− dom number seed is employed to determine one permuta− tion of the image blocks. The size of each block permutation is w´h. Let BP i denote the i−th block permutation generated by using the random sequence induced by the i−th random number seed. The block numbers recorded in BP i will be used to embed the i−th copy of the authentication code for each image block. Let BP i,j denote the i−th block permuta− tion of the j−th block. The i−th copy of the authentication code for the j−th image block is to be embedded into the image block numbered BP i,j . By sequentially embedding each copy of the authentication code for each image block into the selected block based on these block permutations, a total of sno copies of the 1−bit authentication code for each image block are embedded into the bit maps to generate the embedded results.
An example of the permutation with 16 blocks is shown in Fig. 4 . In this example, the value of sno is set to 2. The original block numbers are shown in Fig. 4(a) . The two block permutations generated by using two random number seeds 111 and 133 are shown in Figs. 4(b) and 4(c) , respec− tively. When the authentication code of the first image block is to be embedded, two copies of the authentication code will be embedded into the 4th block and 15th block, respec− tively. Similarly, two copies of the authentication code of the 16th image block will be embedded into the 12th image block and the 11th image block, respectively.
We now turn to illustrate how to embed these sno copies of the authentication codes into the bit map of each com− pressed block. Based on these sno block permutations, we can determine the image blocks into which authentication codes will be embedded. To continue the block permuta− tions listed in Fig. 4 , the reverse mapping of the source image blocks of the authentication codes are listed in Fig. 5 . We find that the authentication codes of the 2nd block and the 9th block will be embedded into the bit map of the first image block. Similarly, the authentication codes of the 7th and the 12th blocks will be embedded into the bit map of the 16th image block.
To embed sno copies of the authentication codes into the bit map BM, BM is divided into sno equal−sized blocks of m bits. The value of m can be calculated according to the fol− lowing equation
An example of bit map division is depicted in Fig. 6 . In this example, the size of the bit map is 4´4 bits. In these three grouping examples as shown in Figs. 6(a) to 6(c), the sno values are set to 2, 3, and 4, respectively. The sizes of the sub−divided block are 8, 5, and 4 when the sno values are set to 2, 3, and 4, respectively. It is shown that there is an unused entry in the bit map of 4´4 bits when the value of no is set to 3.
After the bit map is divided into sno equal−sized sub− −blocks of m bits, these sno copies of authentication codes will be embedded into the bit map. Each sub−block will be used to embed 1−bit authentication data. In other words, the i−th sub−block will be used to embed the i−th copy of the authentication data. To embed each 1−bit authentication code ac into its corresponding sub−block, the parity of these m bits in the sub−block is calculated. If the calculated parity value equals ac, no change is made on the sub−block of m bits. Otherwise, one candidate in the sub−block will be se− lected and changed so that the parity value of the modified sub−block will equal ac.
To select the candidate in the sub−block, the total num− ber of the adjacent neighbours that are classified as the other Opto−Electron. Rev., 21, no. 1, 2013 © 2013 SEP, Warsaw group is calculated. The candidate is the one with the maxi− mal number of adjacent neighbours in the other group. Without the original image, the selection of the candidate in each sub−block to be changed is not an easy task. In the pro− posed scheme, the candidate is the one with the maximal number of adjacent neighbours in the bit map belonging to the other group. When several candidates having the same maximal value are found, the first searched candidate in the sub−block is chosen for simplicity. An example of the authentication codes embedding pro− cess is depicted in Fig. 7 . The bit map of 4´4 bits is listed in Fig. 7(a) . Figure 7 (b) lists the number of the adjacent neigh− bours in the other group for the bit map as shown in Fig. 7(a) . Suppose two authentication codes with value (1) 2 and (0) 2 are to be embedded into the bit map, and the bit map are divided into two sub−blocks of 8 bits. In this exam− ple, the parity values of these sub−blocks equal (1) 2 and (1) 2 , respectively. Based on the parity value of the first sub− −block, the 1−bit authentication code with value (1) 2 is im− plicitly embedded into the sub−block. Therefore, no change is needed for the first sub−block. To embed the 1−bit authen− tication code with value (0) 2 into the second sub−block, the candidate with three different adjacent neighbours in the other group is selected and the embedded results is shown in Fig. 7(c) .
After embedding these sno copies of the authentication codes into the bit map of each compressed image block, the compressed codes of each image block is a trio of (a, b, BM ¢). Here, BM ¢ denotes the resultant bit map after authen− tication data embedding.
The tamper detection procedure
The goal of the tamper detection procedure is to detect whether the BTC compressed image is modified or not. Some system parameters, such as W, H, n, no, DTH, and these sno random number seeds, should be known. The compressed codes of the image consists of w´h trios of (a, b, BM) where w and h equal W/n and H/n, respectively.
The flowchart of the tamper detection procedure is shown in Fig. 8 . To determine whether these w´h image blocks are tampered or not, two sets of authentication codes are to be generated. The first set of authentication codes is generated by the quantization levels of the image blocks described in Sect. 3.1. If the absolute difference between the two quan− tization levels for each image block is less than or equal to DTH, a corresponding authentication code ac with value 0 is stored. Otherwise, the authentication code ac with value 1 is stored for each image block. By sequentially generating the 1−bit authentication code by using the above−mentioned pro− cess, a total of w´h authentication codes are produced.
The second set of the authentication codes of sno copies will be extracted from the received bit maps. To extract these sno copies of authentication codes for each image block, sno random number seeds are needed to generate the block permutations. Let eac i denote the i−th copy of the extracted authentication code where 1 £ i £ sno. Based on the i−th block permutation, the parity value of the i−th sub− −divided bit map is calculated and stored in eac i .
For example, take these two block permutations listed in Fig. 4 and the authentication code of the first image block were embedded into the 4th block and 15th block, respec− tively. The first sub−divided bit map of the 4th block and the second sub−divided bit map of the 15th block were used to embed the authentication code. By calculating the parity values of these two sub−divided bit maps, these two copies of the authentication code can be generated.
When two sets of authentication codes are available, we can determine whether each image block x is tampered or not. Total of (sno + 1) copies of the 1−bit authentication code are to be checked. If these (sno + 1) copies of the authentication code are the same, x is classified as a clear block. Otherwise, x is classified as a modified block. In addition, the corresponding block that was used to embed eac i which was different from ac is classified as a modified block. Here, a white pixel and a black one are used in the detected image for a clear block and a modified block, respectively. When the authentication code ac and these sno copies of the extracted authentication code eac i for each image block x is sequentially checked by the same process, the roughly detected image RDI can then be generated.
The roughly detected image needs to be further refined because two possible problems should be solved. First, we find that some image blocks may be mistakenly classified as the modified blocks because their authentication codes were stored in the truly tampered areas. In addition, the authenti− cation codes that were generated based on Eq. (5) in the tampered areas may still be the same as the original ones. To solve these two problems, the two−stage tamper refinement mechanism is designed to improve the detection accuracy.
In the first stage, the connected components in RDI are searched. If the total number of the block pixels in each con− nected component is less than or equal to the predefined threshold CTH, all the black pixels in the connected compo− nent are changed to white pixels. In other words, we assume that the small−sized modified objects are rarely found. After the small−sized connected components are removed from RDI, the first problem mentioned above should be solved. In the second stage, each isolated white pixel in the detected image is changed to a black pixel to solve the second prob− lem mentioned above. After the two−stage tamper refine− ment mechanism is executed, RDI is processed to generate the final detected image.
Experimental results
Our experiments are performed on windows XP PC with an Intel Core Duo 2.2GHz CPU and the 512 MB RAM. The testing programs are implemented by using Bloodshed Dev C++. In our experiments, six grayscale images of 512×512 pixels "Airplane", "Girl", "Goldhill", "Lenna", "Pepper", and "Toys", as shown in Fig. 9 , are used.
In the simulation, the AMBTC scheme instead of the MPBTC scheme is employed in the simulations. This is because AMBTC is proved to be the MSE optimal scheme when the block mean value is used as the quantization threshold for pixel grouping. Results of the reconstructed image qualities of AMBTC with different block sizes are listed in Table 1 . It is shown that the reconstructed image quality decreases with the increase of the block size. Aver− age image qualities of 41.208 dB, 33.559 dB, and 30.347 dB are achieved by AMBTC when the block sizes are set to 2×2, 4×4, and 8×8, respectively. The bit rates of AMBTC equal 5 bpp, 2 bpp, and 1.25 bpp when the block sizes are set to 2×2, 4×4, and 8×8, respectively. Tables 2 to 4 list the image qualities of the embedded images of the proposed scheme when the block sizes are set to 2×2, 4×4, and 8×8, respectively. It is shown that the image quality of the embedded image decreases with the increase of the sno value. More image quality loss is incur− red when a larger block size is set in the proposed scheme. Average embedded image qualities of 32.582 dB, 31.383 dB, 30.481 dB, and 29.472 dB are achieved by the proposed scheme with 4×4 blocks when the sno values are set to 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. In the tamper detection simulations, the block size used in the proposed scheme is set to 4×4 and four sno values, 1 to 4, are tested. The embedded images "Lenna" of the pro− posed scheme when the block size is set to 4×4 are shown in Fig. 11 . In these four embedded images, the sno values are set to 1 to 4, respectively. In the tamper test, a rose as shown in Fig. 12(a) is added on the shoulder of each embedded image. The corresponding tampered area is shown in Fig.  12(b) . These four tampered images when the sno values are set to 1 to 4 are shown in Fig. 13 .
The pixel difference images and the block difference images for the tamper test are listed in Fig. 14 . From the results, some white spots within the tampered object are found in each pixel difference image. It indicates that some modified pixels within the rose have the same intensities as the original pixels in the embedded image. The total num− bers of the different pixels and the different blocks of the tamper test when the sno values are set to 1 to 4 are listed in Table 5 . It is shown that 498 image blocks are tampered for these sno values. The detected results of the proposed tamper detection procedure are listed in Fig. 15 . The roughly detected images and the refined images are listed. In the simulations, the value of CTH is set to 3. According to the roughly detected images, it is shown that the number of small−sized con− nected components increases when the sno value increases. The detected results of the proposed tamper detection proce− dure with the two−stage tamper refinement mechanism are also shown in Fig. 15 . No white spots are found within the modified area in these refined images. Compared to the tam− pered area as shown in Fig. 12(b) , the tampered area of each refined image is clearly detected. However, some modified blocks in the boundary of the tampered area cannot be detected by using the proposed tamper detection procedure.
The total numbers of the tampered blocks in the roughly detected images and the refined images by using the pro− posed scheme are listed in Table 6 . The numbers of the tam− pered blocks in the roughly detected images equal 1086, 938, 1241, and 1472 when the sno values are 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. There are 509, 511, 506, and 507 tampered blocks in the refined images when the sno values are 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. Results of the false detected images of the proposed tam− per detection procedures are listed in Fig. 16 
Conclusions
A novel tamper detection scheme for BTC compressed ima− ges is proposed in the paper. In the proposed scheme, the authentication codes that are generated based on the quan− tiation levels are embedded into the bit maps. The copies of authentication codes for each image block can be adaptively determined by users to reach a compromise between the embedded image quality and the detection accuracy in the proposed scheme. From the tamper test, the image qualities of the embeded images decrease when the copy of the authentication code increases. Clear tampered areas can be detected for the tam− pered images. To provide good image qualities of the em− bedded images, we suggest that the copy of the authentica− tion code should be set to 2 in the proposed scheme. The random number sequences induced by the selected random number seeds are used to generate the block permutations. Without the same random number seeds, the block permuta− tions can not be generated by the illegal users. To be spe− cific, the proposed tamper detection scheme can be easily applied to the compressed techniques on BTC. 
